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Procedural Complexity of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act: An Age-Old Problem
Robert E. Sheeder*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA or the Act)' was
enacted by Congress "to promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age."' Section 4(a) of the Act makes it
unlawful for an employer' to discriminate against any individual
because of age.4 As originally enacted, the protection afforded individuals by the Act was limited to those individuals who were at least
forty years of age but less than sixty-five years of age.' The 1978
amendments to the Act expanded that protection to include persons
between the ages of forty and seventy years.' In addition to prohibiting discriminatory practices on the part of employers, the ADEA also
prohibits discrimination against members of the protected class by
employment agencies7 and labor organizations." Although these substantive prohibitions of discriminatory practices would appear to be
quite straightforward, the methods of enforcing the prohibitions established by the Act are anything but straightforward. In practice, the
procedures established under the Act present a plethora of time
*B.A., 1973, University of Virginia; J.D., 1976, University of Michigan. Mr. Sheeder is
an associate with Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment
Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976).
3. "Employer" is defined in § 11(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976), as "a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . ...
4. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976). This prohibition includes refusals to hire, discharges, and
discrimination as to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
5. Id. § 631.
6. Act of April 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189. The amendments further provide that nothing in the Act would be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of an individual who is sixty-five, but not seventy, and who, during the two-year
period immediately prior to retirement, is employed in an executive or high policymaking
position, so long as that employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit of at least $27,000. Id. § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189-90. Finally, the amendments permit
the compulsory retirement of any employee who is sixty-five, but not seventy, and is serving under a contract of unlimited tenure at an institution of higher education. Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1976).
8. Id. § 623(c).
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periods and notice requirements which pose potentially fatal pitfalls to
a cause of action.
Enforcement of the substantive prohibitions of the ADEA may be
by either governmental actions' or private suits brought by aggrieved
individuals. 0 Section 7(d) of the Act provides that no civil action may
be commenced by an individual until sixty days after a charge alleging
unlawful discrimination has been filed with the appropriate government agency." The purpose of this sixty-day period is to give the agency
time in which to attempt to achieve compliance with the Act through
the use of informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion,
as required by section 7(d)(2). 2
In addition, the aggrieved party is required to file his charge with
the agency within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred." This 180-day period may be extended to 300 days if the alleged
unlawful practice occurred in a state that has a law prohibiting age
discrimination.' In that event, however, a private action may not be
commenced in federal court under section 7 until the expiration of
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under state law, or
before the official termination of the state proceeding, whichever is
earlier." It should also be noted that section 7(e) of the Act 6 provides
that the statute of limitations contained in the Portal-to-Portal Act 7 is
applicable to all actions brought under the ADEA. Thus, an action
must be brought, at the very latest, before the expiration of two years
following the accrual of the cause of action. This two-year period is extended to three years in the case of a "willful" violation. 8
Since the ADEA was enacted in 1967, the above procedural requirements have been the subject of countless decisions by federal courts,
9. Id. § 626(b). This section authorizes suits by the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to
the enforcement powers granted to the Secretary in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 211(b), 216-17 (1976). On July 1, 1979, the responsibility and authority for enforcement of the ADEA was transferred from the Department of Labor to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 43 Fed.
Reg. 19,807 (1978). For purposes of convenience and clarity, references in this article to
the applicable federal agency charged with enforcing the ADEA will be to the "Secretary" or the "Department of Labor."
10. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976). The right of an aggrieved party to file suit under this
section terminates upon the commencement of an action by the Secretary under § 7(b).
11. Id § 626(d), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b)(1), 92 Stat. 190 (1978).
12. Id. § 626(d)(2), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b)(1), 92 Stat. 190 (1978).
13. Id § 626(d)(1), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b)(1), 92 Stat. 190 (1978).
14. Id. § 633(d)(2), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b)(1), 92 Stat. 190 (1978).
15. Id. § 633(b).
16. Id. § 626(e).
17. Id. §§ 255, 259.
18. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text infra.
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as well as lengthy discussion by legal commentators.' In an effort to
remove some of the procedural ambiguities from the Act, Congress
enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of
1978." In addition to raising the upper age limit of the class protected
by the ADEA from 65 to 70 years and prohibiting certain mandatory
retirement schemes,"' the amendments made several procedural
changes affecting the way an ADEA claim is processed and tried.
Specifically, the amendments provided for a right to a jury trial of
any issue of fact sought in such action.2 In addition, section 7(d) of the
Act2" was amended to remove the requirement that a party file a
"notice of intent" to sue, instead requiring that a party file a
"charge."u As explained by the Conference Committee Report,' the
charge requirement was to be satisfied by the filing of a written statement which "identifies that potential defendant and generally describes" an alleged discriminatory action.H Another change made by
the 1978 amendments was to provide for the tolling of the statute of
limitations for up to one year, while the Secretary of Labor attempts
27
to effect voluntary compliance through conciliation efforts.
Despite these amendments, there remain numerous unresolved questions and problems encountered in the enforcement and effectuation of
the ADEA. This article will be devoted to a discussion of several areas
of the procedural sections of the ADEA that pose particularly vexing
problems for ADEA litigants.
19. See generally Levien, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Statutory
Requirements and Recent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. REV. 227 (1974); Note, The Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act,
44 U. CHI. L. REV. 457 (1977); Note, ProceduralAspects Of The Age Discrimination In
Employment Act Of 1967, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 914 (1975); Note, The Procedural Requirements Of The Age Discrimination In Employment Act Of 1967, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 540
(1978).
20. Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
21. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
22. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 190 (1978). This amendment was a codification
of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978). The right to a jury trial in ADEA actions represents an important distinction between the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). It
is well-established that there is no right to a jury trial under Title VII. See Slack v.
Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 190
(1978).
24. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b)(1), 92 Stat. 190 (1978).
25. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 528 [hereinafter cited as H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950].
26. Id at 534.
27. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(c)(1), 92 Stat. 191 (1978).
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THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

An initial obstacle for potential ADEA plaintiffs is posed by the
statute of limitations. Section 7(e)(1) 8 of the ADEA states that sections
6 and 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947" shall be applicable to actions under the ADEA. Those sections provide for a two-year or, threeyear statute of limitations, depending upon whether or not the violation is deemed to be "willful." Under this provision, the statute of
limitations is measured from the time the action accrues until suit is
commenced by the filing of a complaint.'
In order to determine the length of the statute of limitations, it
must initially be determined if the actions of the defendant company
were "willful," in which case the limitations period is three years, or
"non-willful," in which case the period is two years."' In determining if
violations of the ADEA were "willful," thereby entitling the plaintiff to
the longer three-year period, courts have used the same standards as
have been applied in cases arising under the Fair Labor Standards
Act." Unfortunately, courts have not been entirely consistent in their
definition of "willfulness" under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has given the term an extremely broad reading, concluding that it
merely means that the employer had knowledge of the possible applicability of the statute to the conduct that is eventually found to be a
violation.' In Coleman v. Jiffey June Farms, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
28. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(c)(1), 92 Stat. 191
(1978).
29. Id. §§ 255, 259. Subsection 6(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act applies to actions
brought after May 14, 1947, the date the section was enacted. It provides that causes of
action accruing after May 14, 1947
may be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every
such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the
cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued; ...
Id. § 255.
30. Section 7 of the Portal-to-Portal Act is also incorporated by reference into the
statute of limitations section. Section 7 provides that "[i]n
determining when an action is
commenced for purposes of section 255 of this title, an action commenced on or after May
14, 1947 . . . . shall be considered to be commenced on the date when the complaint is
filed." Id. § 256.
31. Id § 255.
32. ld. §§ 201-217.
33. See, e.g., Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) (willful violation found
where president of employer-company testified that he knew of statute's existence and
had "heard talk" that recent amendments had extended coverage to those in the position
of his employees); Brennan v. J. M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (willful violation established where employer had sent district
managers memoranda advising them of statute's implementation, and requiring them to
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Court of Appeals stated that when attempting to determine whether a
violation is "willful," the relevant inquiry should be: "Did the employer
know the [statute] was in the picture?""u At least one commentator has
criticized this test, reasoning that to interpret the statute of limitations in that manner would have the result of eliminating the two-year
limitations period, since almost every employer knows of the applicability of federal statutes.'
Other courts have adopted a more narrow approach. For example, in
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, in the context of an Equal Pay Act violation,87 ruled that at the very least, an employer's noncompliance with a
statute is "willful" if "he is cognizant of an appreciable possibility that
he may be subject to the statutory requirements and fails to take
steps reasonably calculated to resolve the doubt."' The court further
ruled that a willful violation would be established upon a showing that
an employer, aware of the statutory provisions, "consciously and voluntarily charts a course which turns out to be wrong." 9
Some courts have permitted plaintiffs to avoid summary judgment
by merely alleging the "willfulness" of the defendant's actions, thereby
invoking the longer statutory period. For example, in Wilett v. Emory
and Henry College,'0 where an action was brought under the Equal Pay
Act, the question of whether the two-year statute of limitations applied was specifically raised in the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. The court, in dismissing that contention, reasoned that

report any possible violations); Brennan v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 482 F.2d
825, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1973) (willful violation established by fact that employer had been
apprised of meaning and scope of the statute by virtue of previous wage and hour investigations which had disclosed a number of violations).
34. 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). This test
focuses on whether there is evidence in the record that would support a finding that the
employer knew or suspected that his actions might violate the applicable statute.
The court went on to hold that a willful violation had been established by the fact that
the president of the defendant company knew that the Fair Labor Standards Act had to
be considered, and had obtained advice from his legal counsel as to the FLSA's applicability. Id. The court did not reach the more difficult question of whether a violation would be
willful if the employer should have known of the statute's applicability but, in fact, did
not. Id.
35. See Richards, Monetary Awards in Equal Pay Act Litigation, 29 ARK. L. REV.
328, 338 (1975).
36. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
37. The Equal Pay Act is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1976).
38. 567 F.2d at 461-62.
39. Id. at 462.
40. 427 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Va. 1977), aff'd 569 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1978).
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because the plaintiff's allegation of a willful violation raised a genuine,
issue as to a material fact, summary judgment could not properly be
granted in defendants' favor.4 This decision would appear to be questionable as a matter of statutory construction, since its effect is to
render the distinctions between the two and three year periods virtually meaningless. 2
III.

SIXTY-DAY DEFERRAL TO AGENCY
CONCILIATION EFFORTS

Although not readily apparent, certain problems of interpretation
exist in relation to the sixty-day "deferral period" required by section
7(d) of the Act. That section provides that no civil action may be commenced by an individual until sixty days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Secretary of Labor." Judicial
interpretations of section 7(d) confirm that the sixty-day waiting period
is an integral aspect of the procedural prerequisites to a federal court
action under the ADEA. Courts have almost uniformly held that no
suit could be initiated within sixty days after notice (or a "charge"
under the amended Act) has been given to the federal agency. Moreover, case precedent supports the view that filing a charge with the
federal agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any subsequent
federal court action.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago," the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit denied a claim under the ADEA, in part because the
plaintiff had failed to comply with section 7(d). In ruling that the plaintiff's failure to give the Secretary of Labor sixty days before initiating
suit was grounds for dismissal, the court specifically noted that the
ADEA authorizes a civil action only after plaintiff has given notice to
the Secretary sixty days before filing suit.'"
Similarly, in Edwards v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc.,"
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that an aggrieved individual may sue to enforce statutory rights only after the expiration of
the sixty-day deferral period.47 The court discussed the policies and
purposes of the sixty-day waiting period, stating that it is required "in

41. 427 F. Supp. at 636.
42. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b)(1), 92 Stat.
190 (1978).
44. 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
45. Id. at 1077.
46. 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975).
47. Id. at 1197-98.

1980

ADEA Procedures

order to give the Secretary an opportunity to comply with his statutory duty of seeking to eliminate any discriminatory practices by 'informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion. ' "
In Rucker v. Great Scott Supermarkets," a discharged employee
filed his notice of intent to sue only two days before filing an action in
federal court under the ADEA. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action as being premature. The court specifically held that failure to afford the Secretary
a sixty-day notice of intent to sue required dismissal unless the special
facts of the case warranted equitable relief.' The court went on to find
no basis for equitable relief despite the claim of the grievant that he
had made a "good faith" effort to comply with section 7, and that thisshould suffice to merit access to federal courts. 1
The 1978 amendments to the ADEA inserted the term "charge" in
lieu of the "notice of an intent to file such action" originally used in the
statute as enacted in 1967.u The legislative history of the original Act
indicated that the filing of this "notice" and the lapse of the sixty-day
period were conditions precedent to the filing of a civil action in
federal court." The 1978 change was discussed in the House Conference Report as follows:
This change in language is not intended to alter the basic purpose of
the notice requirement, which is to provide the Department with sufficient information so that it may notify prospective defendants and to provide the Secretary with an opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful
practices through informal methods of conciliation. Therefore, the conferees intend that the "charge" requirement will be satisfied by the filing
of a written statement which identifies the potential defendant and
generally describes the action believed to be discriminatory.
The conferees agree that the "charge" requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an action under the ADEA and that

48. Id. at 1197.
49. 528 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1976).
50. Id. at 395.
51. Id. Judge McCree, in a concurring opinion, elucidated on the grounds for equitable relief: "In a proper case substantial compliance with the statutory preconditions to
suit is sufficient. However, because there were no exceptional circumstances justifying
equitable relief here, the district court properly dismissed appellant's suit." Id. (McCree,
J., concurring) (emphasis added).
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat.
190 (1978).
53. See H.R. REP. NO. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2213, 2218 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 805] ("[A]ggrieved persons may

similarly bring actions but a condition precedent to the bringing of an action by an individual, is notice to the Secretary and the lapse of a period of 60 days. This is to allow the
Secretary time to mediate the grievance.").
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therefore equitable modification for failing to file within the time period
will be available to plaintiffs under this Act."
Nowhere in any of the reports on the 1978 amendments was mention
made of deleting the sixty-day deferral period after a "charge" is made
to the Secretary of Labor. It would appear, therefore, that the legislative purpose behind section 7(d), enunciated by Congress in 1967, was
retained by the 1978 amendments to that section. Even if it could be
assumed that the 1978 amendments were intended to totally remove
the jurisdictional aspects of the "charge," it does not follow that the
sixty-day deferral period requirement is eliminated where a plaintiff
has filed a charge prior to instituting an action in federal court. Such a
result would clearly contravene the legislative intent behind the sixtyday deferral period of section 7(d), of providing the federal agency with
time in which mediation and conciliation can be attempted."
Finally, it should be noted that one change incorporated into section
7 by the 1978 amendments was the addition of subsection (e)(2), which
provides that during the period in which the Secretary is attempting
to effect voluntary compliance through informal conciliation, the statute of limitations will be tolled for up to one year." The legislative
history of the 1978 amendments indicates that this tolling is to commence only after the Secretary of Labor communicates in writing to
the defendants involved in the proceeding.57 Consequently, until actual
written notification is provided to the defendant, there can be no tolling of the statute of limitations.
IV.

FILING WITH STATE AGENCY

In any ADEA action, an initial inquiry involves the existence of applicable state laws and agencies dealing with age discrimination. Section 14(b) of the ADEA M provides that if an alleged unlawful practice
occurred in a state that has a law both prohibiting discrimination in
employment because of age, and authorizing a state agency to seek or
grant relief from the discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought
under the ADEA "before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated .... ,9
54. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, supra note 25, at 534.
55. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
56. Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 191.
57. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, supra note 25, at 534 ("The conferees agree that it is appropriate for the tolling of the statute of limitations to begin when the Department of
Labor states, in a letter to the prospective defendant(s), that it is prepared to commence
conciliation pursuant to section 7(b) of the act").
58. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
59. Id.
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Essentially, courts have interpreted this language in one of three
different ways. Some courts have ruled that filing a charge initially
with the appropriate state agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
any proceedings under the ADEA, and that failure to do so mandates
dismissal of the ADEA lawsuit.' Other courts have ruled that while
section 14(b) requires filing with the state agency, this requirement
may be waived in situations involving equitable considerations which
suggest that a particular plaintiff should be excused for his failure to
file with the state agency." More recently, the)prevalent view was that
no prior resort to a state agency is required as a precondition to an individual's commencing suit under the ADEA. 2 The courts adopting
this view generally interpreted section 14(b) as merely requiring that if
an individual chooses to initially file with a state agency, he must wait
sixty days before initiating proceedings under the ADEA.3
For more than four years, the prevailing view on this question was
represented by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Goger v. H. K. Porter Co." In that case, an employee, Virginia
Goger, was terminated by her employer allegedly in violation of the
ADEA. Shortly after her dismissal, her attorney notified the Secretary
that Goger intended to file suit under the Act, and requested that the
Secretary fulfill his conciliation duties.6 After conciliation efforts failed,
Goger filed suit in federal court. At no time prior to the filing of her
federal action did Goger file a complaint with the New Jersey State
Agency responsible for eliminating unlawful age discrimination."
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the action, the Third
Circuit ruled that although the ADEA does not require an individual
60. See, e.g., Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1975); Goger v.
H. K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 15-16 (3d Cir. 1974) (subsequently overruled en banc); Enos
v. Kaiser Indus. Corp., 443 F. Supp. 798, 800 (D.D.C. 1978); Fitzgerald v. New England
Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 617 (D. Mass. 1976).
61. See, e.g., Griffin v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 443 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 77 (D.N.H. 1977);
Arnold v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 10,786 (D. Hawaii 1976); Vazquez v.
Eastern Air Lines, 405 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975); Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 382 F.
Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1974). See also Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363 (2d Cir.
1978).
62. See, e.g., Holliday v. Ketchem, MacLeod & Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir.
1978) (en banc) (expressly overruling Goger v. H. L. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974);
Smith v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 584 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded
mem., 99 S. Ct. 2819 (1979). Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded mem., 99 S. Ct. 2819 (1979).

63. See, e.g., Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated and
remanded mem., 99 S. Ct. 2819 (1979).

64.
65.
66.

492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
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to exhaust state remedies prior to filing a federal lawsuit, "it does require that the State be given a threshold period of sixty days in which
it may attempt to resolve the controversy, normally by voluntary compliance."' 7 The court went on to hold that "the Congressional intent
that state agencies be given the initial opportunity to act should be
strictly followed and enforced."" The court in Goger placed great reliance on the fact that a comparable provision in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 had been interpreted as requiring resort to a state
fair employment practices agency prior to proceeding under Title VII."
In Holliday v. Ketchum, MacLeod & Grove, Inc.,70 the Third Circuit,
en banc, expressly overruled Goger, holding that "resort to state age
discrimination remedies is not a precondition to maintaining a federal
suit for age discrimination."'" In an opinion by Judge Garth, the court
examined the substantive provisions of the ADEA and concluded that
the remedial purposes of that Act would be frustrated by an interpretation of the section 14(b) procedural requirements which could prevent otherwise meritorious claims from being considered." In addition,
the court noted that section 14(a) permits total disruption of state proceedings by requiring that a federal suit will supersede any state ac67. Id.
68. Id. at 17. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Garth concluded that there is
no requirement in the ADEA that a plaintiff must first attempt to utilize state remedies
prior to filing suit under the Act. Id. (Garth, J., concurring).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976) provides in relevant part:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or
political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the
unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or
local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be
filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated ....
The Supreme Court, in Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972), interpreted this provision as requiring prior resort to the state agency.
70. 584 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978).
71. Id. at 1222. The plaintiff in Holliday had filed his notice with the Secretary 168
days after his discharge, but had not filed his state complaint until 189 days had elapsed.
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission dismissed his complaint, since the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 959 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979), requires that complaints be filed within ninety days of the alleged discriminatory act. Id at
1223.
72. Id at 1230. The court in Holliday rejected the Title VII analogy accepted by the
majority in Goger, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575 (1978) (holding that claimants under ADEA are entitled to a jury trial), specifically rejected the relevance of Title VII procedures to lawsuits that allege age discrimination. 584
F.2d at 1225. The Third Circuit also noted that the Secretary of Labor had consistently
argued that the ADEA affords a claimant a choice of forum. Id. at 1225 n.19.
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tion13 The court reasoned that since the right being vindicated is a
federal right, the deference accorded to state agency procedures
should not be applied in such a manner as to create unnecessary procedural bars'
In Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co.7 5 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Third Circuit did in
Holliday. In Oscar Mayer, the plaintiff, who had been involuntarily
retired after twenty-three years of employment by Oscar Mayer, filed
a notice of intent to sue with the United States Department of Labor
charging that his involuntary retirement had been in violation of the
ADEA. In response to his specific inquiry, the Labor Department informed him that the ADEA has no requirement that he first file a
state claim in order to preserve his federal rights.7 6 Following unsuccessful conciliation efforts, Evans brought suit against the company in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The
company unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the Iowa Civil Rights Commission was empowered to
remedy age discrimination in employment and that by failing to file a
charge with that commission, Evans had failed to comply with the
jurisdictional prerequisites of section 14(b).7
Initially, a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit ruled that filing
with the appropriate state agency was a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit under the ADEA . 8 However, after a rehearing en banc, the court
withdrew the earlier decision, in large part because of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp.7 9 in which that court had
reached the opposite result. The Eighth Circuit, after noting that a
definitive answer to the question could not be found in either the
language of the ADEA, its legislative history, or the policy behind it,
ruled that filing with a state agency is optional.' The court held that if
an individual does file a complaint with the state agency, he must
observe the waiting period prescribed by section 14(b), but that a plaintiff is not required to file a state complaint before bringing suit in
73. 584 F.2d at 1230.
74. Id. The court was influenced by statements contained in the Senate Report on
the 1978 amendments to the Act, to the effect that Congress' view of the ADEA is that
an individual has an option of initially filing with the state agency, or of directly proceeding with his remedies under federal law. Id. at 1229. See discussion at note 85 and accompanying text infra.
75. 580 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1978), reversed, 99 S. Ct. 2066 (1979).
76. Id. at 301 (Bright, J., dissenting).
77. Id.at 299.
78. Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co., 17 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 221 (8th Cir. 1978), opinion
withdrawn, 580 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1978).
79. 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded mem., 99 S. Ct. 2819 (1979).
80. 580 F.2d at 300.
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federal court, so long as he has complied with the basic waiting period
set forth in section 7(d). 8
On appeal from that ruling, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the ADEA, resort to administrative
remedies by a claimant in a state with an agency empowered to
remedy age discrimination is mandatory, and that suit may not be
brought in federal court unless the aggrieved party has first commenced a proceeding with the appropriate state agency."' The Supreme
Court's opinion in Oscar Mayer can at best be characterized as a compromise. In the first two parts of the opinion, delivered by Justice
Brennan and joined in by Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, the Court held that resort to state agencies was mandatory,
rather than optional. The Court, in reaching that conclusion, specifically ruled that section 14(b) of the ADEA was patterned after section
706(b) of Title VII,' and that the two sections had identical purposesto screen from federal courts discrimination complaints that could be
settled in state proceedings." Since resort to state proceedings was required under section 706(b) of Title VII, it followed that section 14(b) of
the ADEA also required resort to the state agency prior to a federal
court action. 5
In Part II of the opinion, the Court ruled that section 14(b) did not
require an ADEA grievant to commence state proceedings within the
time limits specified by state law. Thus, the Court removed most of
the jurisdictional impediments posed by section 14(b) in holding that
only the commencement of state proceedings ,was required, not the
timely initiation of such proceedings."
81. Id.
82. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 99 S. Ct. 2066, 2072-73 (1979).
83. Id. at 2071. For the text of § 706(b), see note 69 supra.
84. Id.
85. Id. The Court noted that ADEA claimants do not have the option to ignore state
remedies merely because under the ADEA, unlike Title VII, they may file simultaneously
with state and federal agencies. Id. at 2072. Also, the Court declined to place reliance
upon statements contained in the Senate Committee Report on the 1978 amendments to
the Act, which suggested that resort to state remedies should be optional under § 14(b).
See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG..& AD.
NEws 496, 509-10, adopted in H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, supra note 25, at 534. In rejecting
those statements, the Court noted that the 1978 amendments did not change § 14(b), and
that the statements of a Congress 11 years after the ADEA was enacted were not probative of the intent of the Congress that enacted § 14(b). 99 S. Ct. at 2072.
86. 99 S. Ct. at 2073. The Court reasoned as follows:
By its terms, then, the section requires only that state proceedings be commenced
60 days before federal litigation is instituted; besides commencement no other obligation is placed upon the ADEA grievant. In particular, there is no requirement
that, in order to commence state proceedings and thereby preserve federal rights,
the grievant must file with the State within whatever time limits are specified by
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Finally, in Part III of the opinion, in which Justice Brennan was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
Stevens, the Court held that even though the 120-day statute of limitations under the Iowa fair employment practices statute had passed, the
federal lawsuit was to be held in abeyance while the grievant was afforded an opportunity to file his untimely action with the Iowa Civil
Rights Commission. If the state complaint was subsequently dismissed
as untimely, the grievant was then to be permitted to return to federal
court and recommence his federal action. 7
In essence, although the Oscar Mayer decision only requires compliance with the applicable federal notice period, a state filing must be
made where required under the particular state's law. 8 In any case,
federal proceedings must be held in abeyance for up to sixty days after
the commencement of state proceedings, unless the appropriate state
agency has determined that the charge is unmeritorious or untimely.
Such a result permits access to the federal courts without infringing
upon the deference to state proceedings provided for by the Act.

V.

THE APPLICABLE 180/300 DAY TIME LIMITS
A.

Time When Period Begins to Run

In addition to the thorny procedural questions with which courts
have been confronted when interpreting section 14(b) of the ADEA,
complex procedural issues have also been raised in relation to the filing requirements and time limitations contained in section 7(d) of the
Act. 9 As noted earlier, section 7(d)(1) requires an aggrieved party to
file a charge with the Secretary within 180 days after the alleged
unlawful practice occurred, or, if it occurred in a state having a fair
employment practice statute and agency, within 300 days after the oc-

state law. Rather, use of the word "commence" strongly implies the opposite-that
state limitations periods are irrelevant-since, by way of analogy, under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even a time-barred action may be "commenced"
by the filing of a complaint.
Id.
87. Id. at 2075-76. In holding that the federal action should be held in abeyance, the
Court noted that suspension of proceedings was preferable to dismissal with leave to
refile. In the Court's view, to require a second filing after termination of state proceedings would merely create another procedural technicality, a result that the Court characterized as inappropriate in view of the remedial nature of the ADEA. Id. at 2076 n.13. See
also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
88. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 190
(1978).
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currence. 0 The purpose of this filing requirement is to provide the
Secretary with information so that he may notify prospective defendants and attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through
informal methods of conciliation. 1
The first and most obvious problem raised by the filing requirements contained in section 7(d) is to ascertain when the 180-day (or
300-day) period begins to run. The issue generally becomes a difficult
one in situations in which an employee is discharged (or the victim of
some involuntary retirement plan), but receives severance pay or some
other benefit which extends beyond the employee's last day of work.
This precise issue was addressed by the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc.," in which the
plaintiff alleged that his employment had been terminated in violation
of the ADEA. The employer argued that the action was untimely, because the plaintiff had not filed his notice of intent to sue with the
Secretary until 229 days after his notice of termination and last day
worked."3 Plaintiff argued that the period did not begin to run until he
received his last paycheck from defendant employer, a date 169 days
before he filed with the Secretary of Labor."' The court rejected the
plaintiffs argument, holding that "where unequivocal notice of termination and the employee's last day of work coincide, then the alleged
unlawful act will be deemed to have occurred on that date, notwithstanding the employee's continued receipt of certain employee benefits
such as periodic severance payments or extended insurance coverage." 5
90. Id. As originally enacted, the ADEA required the individual to file a "notice of intent to sue" with the Secretary. This phrase created interpretative problems, since it was
unclear whether this "notice" could be oral or informal. See, e.g., Hays v. Republic Steel
Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976) (oral complaint to secretary does not satisfy § 7(d));
Enos v. Kaiser Industries Corp., 443 F. Supp. 798 (D.D.C. 1978) (same result). But see
Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973). In amending § 7(d) to
require the filing of a "charge," Congress made it clear that a written statement is required. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, supra note 25, at 534 ("[The conferees intend that
the 'charge' requirement will be satisfied by the filing of a written statement which identifies the potential defendant and generally describes the action believed to be discriminatory").
91. See H.R. REP. No. 805, supra note 54, at 2218. See also Note, ProceduralPrerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 457, 463 (1977) ("A major purpose of this scheme is to provide the Secretary of
Labor with an opportunity to avert litigation by attempting an informal settlement").
92. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
93. Id. at 191. The court ruled that Bonham was not entitled to the extended 300-day
period, because he had failed to file a timely charge with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Id. at 192 n.5.
94. Id. at 191.
95. Id. The court therefore held that the 180-day period begins to run when "the
employee knows, or as a reasonable person should know, that the employer has made a
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A similar result was reached by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Payne v. Crane Co.," a case in which the discharged plaintiff
was informed of his termination by the employer in January, 1975,
worked his last day on April 7, 1975, returned all company credit cards
and travel papers on May 1, 1975, but was paid through June 30,
1975."7 The employee argued that the 180-day period did not begin until
June 30, 1975, the date of his last paycheck. The district court had
ruled that the period began on May 1, 1975, the date upon which the
employer's intention was clear to plaintiff. 8 In affirming the district
court's conclusion, the Fifth Circuit held that "when the employer, by
acts or words, shows a clear intention to dispense with the services of
an employee, a discharge occurs at the latest date after which the services are no longer accepted.""
Although the conclusions of the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals are shared by most of the district courts that have addressed
the issue, 00 this conclusion is contrary to that reached by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.1"' In
that case, the plaintiff was informed of her discharge on November 12,
1973, worked her last day on November 16, 1973, but was paid for accrued vacation time through November 30, 1973.0' The Eighth Circuit
final decision to terminate him, and the employee ceases to render further services to the
employer." Id at 192. The court in Bonham reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in the employer's favor, however, holding that the requirements of § 7(d)
were not jurisdictional, and that they were therefore subject to equitable modification.
The case was remanded to the district court for a resolution of the question of whether
equitable modification was appropriate. Id. at 192-93.
96. 560 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
97. Id. at 199. Plaintiff did not give notice of his intent to sue until December 1, 1975.
Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Thomas v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 449 F. Supp. 1021 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (180 day
period began to run on last day worked, not on day employee was removed from coverage
under employer's group insurance policy); Aronsen v. Crown Zellerbach, 18 Fair Emp.
Prac. Cas. 971 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (notice period began when employer informed employee
that he was terminated, not when his terminal leave of absence with pay ended); Noto v.
JFD Elec. Corp., 446 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (period began to run on date upon which
employee was terminated, rather than subsequent date upon which he last received severance pay); Johnston v. Aerojet Gen. Corp., 18 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1107 (E.D. Cal. 1978)
(same result). See also Davis v. RJR Foods, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (dictum),
aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1977). But see Davis v. Boy Scouts of America, 457 F.
Supp. 665 (D.N.J. 1978) (period did not begin to run until after employee had taken his
accrued vacation time, as directed by his superiors, even though that date was almost
three weeks later than the employee's last official contact with the employer).
101. 525 F.2d 92 (8th Cir. 1975).
102. Id. at 93. Apparently, the plaintiff had been scheduled to be on vacation the week
after November 16, and was told to take an additional week. Id. She was officially terminated on the company's books as of November 30, 1973. Id. at 95.
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held that the official administrative termination date would serve as
the beginning of the 180-day period, since it was on that date that the
employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant company had
been totally severed." 3
However, the decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits.. would appear to be sounder, as a matter of legal reasoning and statutory construction, than the Eighth Circuit's holding in Moses. Section 7(d)(1) of
the Act very explicitly requires that a charge be filed with the
Secretary within 180 days "after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.""' The Third Circuit, in Bonham, and the Fifth Circuit, in Payne,
correctly concluded that the alleged unlawful practice occurs when the
employee is informed of his termination, and his services are no longer
accepted by the employer. The Eighth Circuit, in Moses, seems to be
focusing not upon when the practice occurs, but rather upon when the
effects of the practice occur (i.e., when the benefits cease to flow from
the employment relationship). Thus, the interpretation and holding of
the Eighth Circuit in Moses would appear to be contrary to the plain
meaning of the language employed by Congress in section 7(d), and has
been rejected by almost every other court that has considered it."'
B.

Length of the Applicable Period

A second question arising under section 7(d) of the ADEA is
whether a grievant in a state with applicable age discrimination prohibitions and an enforcement agency may automatically benefit from
the longer 300-day period provided by section 7(d)(2) or must file a
charge within the shorter 180-day period. ' ' This question has been
made a particularly vexing one by the Supreme Court's decision in
Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans."' In Oscar Mayer, the Court ruled that
the proceedings only need to be "commenced with the appropriate
state agency in order to fulfill the requirements of section 14(b) regardless of applicable state time limitations. ' 9 A related question not
directly answered by the Oscar Mayer Court is whether a grievant

103. Id. at 93-94.
104. See notes 92-99 and accompanying text supra.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 190
(1978) (emphasis added).
106. See note 100 supra.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 190
(1978).
108. 99 S. Ct. 2066 (1979).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976). See 99 S. Ct. at 2073. See also notes 86-88 and accompanying text supra.
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proceeding under the ADEA may invoke the longer 300-day period
under section 7(d)(2),1 10 even if no state charge has been filed within
180 days of the alleged violation.
Under the analogous provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,111 it has been held that where there is no state filing within
180 days, a plaintiff may not invoke the longer 300-day period for filing
a federal action."' It has been recognized that the purpose of the
longer period for filing a federal charge is not so much to extend the
time for asserting one's federal rights, but rather, to provide complainants living in a deferral state time in which to have their local or state
agency process their claims without jeopardizing their federal cause of
action. '
In Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp.,' 4 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
specifically discussed this question in a case involving an ADEA grievant who had failed to file a timely complaint with the Michigan Civil
Rights Commission. The plaintiff, Clement Gabriele, was employed by
Chrysler Corporation as an engineer from 1965 until he was laid off on
May 9, 1975."' On August 15, 1975, he filed a complaint with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission alleging age discrimination. On September 3, 1975, he was notified by the Michigan Commission that his
complaint was dismissed as untimely under the Michigan law requiring
that complaints be filed within ninety days of the alleged discriminatory act. On November 6, 1975, he filed an action in federal court. The
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed his action, holding that Section 14(b) of the ADEA mandated prior resort to
an appropriate state agency. 6
The court of appeals reversed on appeal, holding that section 14(b)
does not require prior resort to an available state agency. 7 The court
then went on to note that although section 14(b) might provide an

110. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 190
(1978).
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).
112. See, e.g., Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975); Dubois
v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1972); Wittshire v. Standard Oil Co., 447 F.
Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Anderson v. Port Auth., 12 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1101 (W.D.
Pa. 1976).
113. See Anderson v. Port Auth., 12 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1101, 1102 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
114. 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded mem., 99 S. Ct. 2819 (1979).
115. Id. at 950.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 955. Of course, that question has now been settled by the Supreme Court's
decision in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 99 S. Ct. 2066 (1979), in which the Court ruled
that prior resort to the appropriate state agency is mandatory. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
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ADEA grievant with an option of proceeding with either a state or
federal action, there must be an attempt to use the state mechanism
to obtain the longer 300-day filing period under section 7(d)(2)." ' In
reaching that conclusion, the Gabriele court reasoned that a grievant
would need the additional time provided by section 7(d)(2) only if he used
it to allow the state agency to attempt to obtain a conciliation.",
This issue has also been addressed by other district courts and
courts of appeals. For example, in Griffin v. First PennsylvaniaBank,
N. A.' a forty-seven year old man alleged that he had been unlawfully
terminated from his position as a bank commercial officer due to age.
The plaintiff alleged that he had not learned that three younger persons had been transferred into his former department until a month
after his termination. Griffin filed his complaint with the Department
of Labor 187 days after his termination, and neglected to file any claim
with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission."'
The district court denied a motion to dismiss based upon the untimely filing and the failure to file a grievance with the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission, finding certain equitable reasons to toll
the period for one month and holding that the failure to file with the
state agency was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.'" Initially,
however, the court noted that the relevant period was the 180-day
period and not the longer 300-day filing period of section 7(d)(2)." 3
In the same month, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided the
case of Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc.12 4 Although the court in that
case held that a plaintiffs failure to file a notice of intent to sue within
180 days of his alleged unlawful termination was not grounds for dismissal because of equitable considerations, the court based its decision
on the shorter 180-day period. In a footnote to the opinion, the court
specifically stated that a plaintiff could not invoke the longer 300-day
period without making a timely state filing.2 5 To do otherwise, the
118. Id.
119. Id The court noted that any filing with the state agency need only be accomplished
within the 180-day period allowed for federal filing under section 7(d)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(d)(1) (1976), in order to entitle the plaintiff to the longer 300-day period set forth in
§ 7(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1976). 573 F.2d at 955.
120. 443 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
121. Id at 564-65.
122. Id at 569. The court based this holding on the fact that at the time of his dismissal the plaintiff was told there was a possibility he could be recalled, and that he had
no reason to suspect he was an object of discrimination until one month following his termination. Id
123. Id at 565.
124. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). For a discussion of
the facts in Bonham see notes 164-67 and accompanying text infra.
125. Id at 192 n.5.
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court noted, would enable a plaintiff to intentionally wait beyond the
time the state filing period has run, and to then benefit from the
lengthier federal filing period. 2 '
In Oscar Mayer, the Supreme Court ruled that if a plaintiff had filed
a federal charge within 180 days of the alleged violation, the plaintiff's
failure to file a state charge would not be fatal to his federal cause of
action.' The Supreme Court noted that it would not be appropriate to
bar a timely federal charge (filed within 180 days) on the grounds that
no timely state charge was filed, because states have different rules on
timeliness. Therefore, it held that all timely federal charges may proceed, even if no state charge had yet been filed. 28
At two points in the opinion, however, the Court implied that the
additional 120 days for filing a federal charge, provided by section
7(d)(2), were available only to those plaintiffs who utilize available state
procedures, even if they were untimely. First, after noting that various
states have differing rules on timeliness, the Court cited the decision
of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
DeGideo v. Sperry-Univac Co.1"' The citation of DeGideo by the Oscar
Mayer Court is quite instructive as to the question of which charge
period applies. The sentence of the DeGideo opinion cited in Oscar
Mayer states that "[ijf a complainant fails to file a timely charge with a
state agency, there is no need to extend the period for filing with the
EEOC since there is no claim before the state to process.""
At another point, the Oscar Mayer Court observed in a footnote that
"even if the risk of bypass of state agencies were real, which it is not,
States could readily avoid the possibility by extending their limitations
126. The footnote stated as follows:
We reject the proposition that Bonham may invoke the extended 300-day period
of section 626(d)(2) notwithstanding his failure to make a timely state filing ....
Any
other rule would mean that plaintiff could intentionally wait until after the state filing period had run, and then take advantage of the lengthier federal filing period.
This was surely not the intent of Congress.
Id Similar reasoning was applied by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania in Wagner v. Sperry Univac Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 458 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In that case, a former employee alleged that because of his age,
the defendant company had discriminatorily refused to grant his requests for transfers
and had later terminated him. In sustaining a motion for partial summary judgment, the
court noted that there was no contention that the 300-day limitation of section 7(d)(2) was
available where no state filing was made within 180 days of his termination. Id at 511.
The court then went on to grant partial summary judgment for all claims arising from the
plaintiffs termination, since those claims had been filed with the Labor Department 182
days after the termination. Id. at 513.
127. See 99 S. Ct. at 2076.
128. Id. at 2073-74.
129. 415 F. Supp. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1976), cited in Oscar Mayer, 99 S. Ct. at 2075.
130. Id. at 231.
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periods to 180 days and by tolling their statutes of limitations upon the
filing of a timely charge with the Department of Labor.'' 3 ' Thus, by implication, the Supreme Court recognized that unless there is a timely
state filing within that time period an ADEA plaintiff cannot avail
himself of the longer, 300-day period. As the Court indicated in the
footnote, all state charges would be timely under state law if the state
filing period were extended to 180 days (many are shorter) and the
period then tolled upon the filing of a timely charge with the Department of Labor. Obviously, if a federal charge could, under any circumstances, be timely filed for a period of up to 300 days, the rationale
of the Supreme Court as to the 180-day state filing period would be incorrect. It would therefore appear that under the holding of Oscar
Mayer, the longer 300-day federal filing period may be invoked only if
there has been a timely state filing within 180 days after the alleged
violation of the ADEA.
In the recent decision of Bean v. Crocker NationalBank,'32 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the 300-day notice of charge period
applied even where an ADEA plaintiff failed to file a charge with the
state agency within 180 days. In that case, a class action was brought
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, on behalf of several employees who had recently been terminated
by Crocker National Bank. The district court granted the defendant
summary judgment against all but one of the complainants, holding
that their failure to file proceedings with the state agency pursuant to
section 14(b) of the Act deprived the court of jurisdiction. In addition,
the court dismissed the actions of two of the complainants because
neither had filed a notice of intent to sue within 180 days following
their termination, as specified by section 7(d)."'
In reversing the district court, the court of appeals relied on Oscar
Mayer to hold that the failure to file a charge with the applicable state
agency does not bar an action in federal court.'-3 Additionally, the
court held that the failure of two complainants to file notices within
180 days did not preclude them from filing a valid charge within the
longer 300-day period.135 The court specifically rejected the argument
that the 300-day period is only applicable when state proceedings have
been initiated, holding that section 7(d) establishes a definite 300-day
period in deferral states "regardless of whether state actions have
been timely commenced."'3 6 In so holding, the court relied on Oscar
131. 99 S. Ct. at 2076 n.11.
132. 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979).
133. Id. at 757.
134. Id.
135. Id at 757-59.
136. Id. at 759.
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Mayer. After noting that Oscar Mayer removed the prerequisites of filing with an applicable state agency prior to commencing a federal action, the Bean court stated that under the rationale of that decision,
compliance with state time limitations must also be deemed irrelevant
1 37
for purposes of determining the applicable notice of charge period.
This holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly misinterprets the thrust of Oscar Mayer as it relates to the applicable notice of
charge period issue. The court in Bean offered no further rationale for
this particular holding, and under the circumstances of the case, involving numerous plaintiffs and other issues of law, it may be concluded
that little real reflection was given to the specific issue. The reasoning
employed in Bean renders the provision for the shorter 180-day period
totally meaningless, obviously contravening congressional intent. The
approach taken by the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits, and impliedly approved by the Supreme Court in Oscar Mayer,
would appear to be more consistent with the general congressional intent behind section 7(d). 1" Thus, the longer 300-day period should not
be available to a plaintiff unless that plaintiff has filed a timely claim
with the applicable state agency within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory act.
VI.

EQUITABLE TOLLING

A second issue which flows from the procedural requirements of section 7(d) of the ADEA3 9 is whether timely compliance with the filing
requirements of that section is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a lawsuit
under the Act. Prior to 1978, some courts had ruled that the requirement of filing a notice of intent to sue with the Secretary within 180
days of the alleged violation was jurisdictional, and that a plaintiff's
failure to comply with that requirement mandated dismissal of the action."' The prevailing view, however, had been that these requirements were not jurisdictional prerequisites, but were more analogous
137. It should be noted that the court went on to hold that under the ADEA it is not
necessary for each complainant to individually file a notice of intent to sue pursuant to §
7(d), but rather, a representative action may be brought by a grievant who has complied
with § 7(d) on behalf of "similarly situated," individuals. Once again, the court relied on
the liberal construction given this "remedial" statute by Oscar Mayer. Id. at 759-60.
138. See notes 117-131 and accompanying text supra.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 190
(1978).
140. See, e.g., Hiscott v. General Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1975); Law v. United
Airlines, Inc., 519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975); Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d
485 (5th Cir. 1974); Black v. Hunter Packing Co., 427 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Ill. 1977), rev'd
mem., 588 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1978); Brohl v. Singer Co., 407 F. Supp. 936 (M.D. Fla. 1976);
Oshiro v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 80 (D. Hawaii 1974).
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to statutes of limitations, and were therefore subject to equitable
modification in appropriate circumstances.'
By retaining the timeliness requirements in the 1978 amendments,
despite the original elimination of all such requirements under the
Senate version of the amendments, "' Congress confirmed that compliance with the time periods is an integral part of the procedural
framework of the Act. A congressional committee did, however, suggest that in limited circumstances, the requirements of section 7(d)
might be subject to equitable modification. As previously discussed,
the 1978 amendments inserted the word "charge" in section 7(d) in
place of the phrase "notice of intent to file such action." In recommending that change, the Conference Committee stated that the
"charge" requirement was not to be considered "a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintaining an action under the ADEA and that therefore
equitable modification for failing to file within the time period will be
14 3
available to plaintiffs under this Act."
Thus, although the 180-day (or 300-day) filing period has been retained, this period may be subject to "equitable modification" in certain
cases in which the plaintiff is able to demonstrate some compelling
reason which would justify such relief. In order to ascertain what circumstances will be taken into consideration by courts in deciding
whether equitable modification is appropriate in a particular case, it is
helpful to examine the decisions in which equitable tolling has been
permitted. Particularly relevant are the three decisions cited in the
1978 Conference Committee Report as epitomizing the intent of the
amendments.
In Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., "4 a discharged employee brought an action
under the ADEA 36 days beyond the applicable 180-day period. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the action was not
barred for untimeliness despite the late filing. The facts of Dartt are
particularly important in understanding the basis adopted by the court
for tolling the 180-day period. Initially upon her discharge, Mrs. Dartt
141. See Kephart v. Institute of Gas Tech., 581 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1978); Bonham v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Gabriele
v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded mem., 99 S. Ct.
2819 (1979); Charlier v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 556 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977); Dartt v.
Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by an evenly divided court, 434 U.S. 99
(1977).
142. See S. REP. No. 95-697, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 496, 515.
143. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, supra note 25, at 534. As examples of situations in
which the § 7(d) requirements had been modified for equitable reasons, the conference
report contained citations to Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by
an evenly divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977), Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978), and Charlier v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
556 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977).
144. 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by an evenly divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
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consulted an attorney, who told her to refer her age discrimination
complaint to the Labor Department's local Wage and Hour Division
office." 5 Dartt did so promptly and was told by the Assistant Area
Director that it might take up to one year to conclude the necessary
investigations.'" A series of investigations were then conducted by the
local office of the Wage and Hour Division. Some difficulty was encountered by the investigators in acquiring statistical information promised
by Shell Oil Company personnel. Finally, after not receiving the information, the Assistant Area Director notified Dartt by letter of the
delay, and at that time informed her of her private right to sue, enclosing a pamphlet detailing the provisions of the ADEA and informing
her of the applicable time limitations for filing a private lawsuit. Dartt
later testified that this constituted her first actual notice of her right
to bring a private action and of the 180-day notice requirement. Immediately, Dartt retained private counsel who then mailed the notice
of intent to file suit 36 days beyond the applicable 180-day period.1, 7.

Under these circumstances, the court held that for equitable
reasons, the 180-day period must be tolled to allow the action. At the
outset, the court dismissed the plaintiff's argument that filing a mere
"complaint" with the Labor Department fulfilled the notice requirement. Instead, actual notice of intent to bring suit was held to be
necessary under the ADEA."' In addressing the equitable tolling question, the court reasoned that the ADEA should be interpreted to effectuate the congressional intent of eradicating age discrimination in'
employment. ' It followed from that conclusion that Dartt, who had,
persistently attempted to assert her rights under the ADEA, would
not be'50required to strictly comply with the time periods of section
7(d)(1).

Several factors emerge from the discussion forming the basis for the
court's equitable modification of the 180-day notice period in Dartt.
The court noted that the two basic purposes behind the 180-day notice
requirement are (1) "[tlo provide the Labor Department with an opportunity to achieve a conciliation of the complaint while the complaint is
still fresh" and (2) to provide "early notice to the employer of a possible lawsuit."' 5' In the court's view, the latter purpose promoted both
the preservation of evidence as well as good faith negotiating by employers during conciliation.' 52 The court held that both purposes had
145. Id. at 1258.
146. Id
147. Id
148. Id. at 1259.
149. Id. at 1260.
150. Id151. Id. at 1261.
152. Id,
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been fulfilled despite plaintiffs tardy filing of the notice. Shell had
received early notification of Dartt's allegations by telephone contact
the same day Dartt registered her complaint with the Labor Department. Also, the Labor Department had initiated timely efforts to con153
ciliate the complaint well before receiving her notice of intent to sue.
Several other facts were cited by the court as justifying equitable
modification. First, the Assistant Area Director had failed to advise
Dartt of the 180-day notice requirement, as was the customary practice. ' " Second, the failure of Shell Oil Company to provide the agreed
upon information in a timely fashion contributed to Dartt's failure to
notify the Secretary of Labor within the 180-day period.' 55 Finally, the
court stated that the notice of information pertaining to the ADEA, required to be posted by section 8 of the Act,15 was completely inadequate to inform Dartt of the 180-day notice requirement, since no
specific mention of the requirement had been included in the posted
notice.'57 Although all of these facts supported the court's permitting
equitable tolling in Dartt, perhaps the most important fact, mentioned
throughout the opinion, was the persistent effort of Dartt to enforce
her rights. She consistently endeavored to have her complaint processed and did not "sleep on her rights.""'
A second decision exemplifying the circumstances under which tolling might be permitted is Charlier v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc."" In
that case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
180-day notice period would be tolled because the plaintiff had not
received adequate notice of his rights under the ADEA.?' In reaching
that conclusion, the court focused on the employer's failure to comply
with section 8 of the Act, which requires employers to post notices in6
forming employees of their rights under the ADEA."'
153. Id. at 1261-62.
154. Id. at 1262.
155. Id.
156. See note 161 and accompanying text infra.
157. 539 F.2d at 1262.
158. Id.
159. 556 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977).
160. Id. at 765.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1976). Section 8 requires an employer covered by the Act to
"post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises a notice to be prepared or
approved by the Secretary setting forth information as the Secretary deems appropriate
to effectuate the purposes of [the ADEA]." Id Pursuant to § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1976), the
Department of Labor promulgated the following regulation to define the adequacy of the
posters required by § 8:
Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization which has an obligation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 shall post and keep
posted in conspicuous places upon its premises the notice pertaining to the applicability of the Act prescribed by the Secretary of Labor or his authorized representa-
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The employer in Charlier had placed ADEA posters on a bulletin
board at its regional office in Houston, Texas. The plaintiff, however,
operated out of his personal residence in Austin, Texas, and had
visited the regional office only three times during his almost twenty
years with the company.'
In light of these facts, the court held that
the plaintiff had not received adequate notice as required by section 8,
and that the filing period would therefore be tolled, at least until the
date on which the grievant retained an attorney or acquired actual
knowledge of his rights under the ADEA.113
In ruling that an employee should at least be given an opportunity
to demonstrate the existence of factors that could justify tolling the
180-day period, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Bonham
v. DresserIndustries, Inc., relied in part upon the employer's alleged
failure to post signs on the premises advising employees of the existence of the Act.' 5 Another factor mentioned in Bonham as justification for tolling the 180-day period was the plaintiff's alleged lack of
knowledge that he had been terminated or that a cause of action had
accrued, possibly created by his receipt of a letter from the employer
which implied that reinstatement was being considered.' 6 In remanding the case to the district court for a determination as to whether the
facts justified equitable tolling, the Third Circuit indicated that tolling
would be justified in situations in which "the employer's own acts or
omissions have lulled the plaintiff into foregoing prompt attempts to
6 7
vindicate his rights."'
Several general guidelines for equitable tolling can be gleaned from
these three decisions cited by the Conference Committee Report as
illustrating factors dictating the tolling of the 180-day period. First, a
factor common to all three cases was the plaintiff's lack of knowledge
or notice of ADEA rights. All three decisions contained statements
that the plaintiff had no "actual" knowledge of the 180-day filing requirement. As the court noted in Bonham, the tolling can only continue

tive. Such a notice must be posted in prominent and accessible places where it can
readily be observed by employees, applicants for employment and union members.
29 C.F.R. § 850.10 (1978).
162. 556 F.2d at 763, 764.
163. Id. at 762. In Kephart v. Institute of Gas Tech., 581 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1978), the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that an employer's failure to post the
notice required by section 8 automatically tolls the 180-day period until the time when the
employee either retains an attorney or acquires actual knowledge of his rights under the
ADEA.
164. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
165. Id at 193.
166. Id. at 190 nn.3 & 4, 193.
167. Id. at 193.
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until the plaintiff acquires actual knowledge or seeks out an
attorney."
Moreover, in each case there was inadequate posting of notice as
prescribed under section 8 of the ADEA. There is some conflict as to
the adequacy of such "posted" notice in the cited cases. The Bonham
court stated that compliance with the posting regulations is sufficient
to give adequate notice. 9 Dartt, however, indicates that mere compliance with the regulations is insufficient, and that some mention of
the 180-day notice limitation may be required in the posted notice to
preclude equitable tolling of the notice of intent period. 7 ' In reality,
the standard may be based on the effectiveness of notice as to the particular individual. Charlier indicates that adequate notice as to certain
individuals may be inadequate as to others, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. According to Charlier, the posted
notice must provide a "meaningful opportunity" for employees to
Under Bonham, however, if an
become aware of their rights.'
employer complies with the posting requirements, a fortiori the
employees have constructive knowledge of their rights under the Act.
The analysis in Dartt, Charlier and Bonham confirms the importance
of compliance with the applicable time periods for assertion of rights
under the ADEA. These decisions further demonstrate certain circumstances under which compliance with those periods may be excused,
focusing upon whether employees either knew or had a meaningful opportunity to become aware of their ADEA rights and the applicable
ADEA procedures.
VII.

ACCRUAL OF

ADEA

ACTIONS-CONTINUING

VIOLATIONS

A question often raised under the ADEA is when the cause of action
actually accrues. This same issue has also been raised in numerous
Title VII cases. For example in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 7' the
Supreme Court faced a situation in which a female flight attendant
168. 1&
169. Id at 193 n.7.
170. The notice posted in Dartt stated as follows: "If you feel you have been discriminated against in matters of hiring, discharge, compensation, or other phases of employment because of your age, contact the: U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division." 539 F.2d at 1262 n.5.
171. 556 F.2d at 764. This comports with the later decision in Adams v. Federal Signal
Corp., 559 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1977). In that case, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the 180-day
period would not be tolled because of the company's failure to post on-premises notice of
the ADEA, since it was part of the plaintiff's job responsibility to post on-premises notice
of the Act. See also Malinowski v. State Farm Ins. Co., 18 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 693 (W.D.
Pa. 1978) (employee who filed untimely notice not entitled to equitable relief for
employer's failure to post notice at all offices, since employer posted a notice at the
regional office, and employee was the superintendent in charge of posting notices).
172. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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who was forced to resign for a period of time under the airline company's no-marriage policy claimed loss of seniority after the policy had
been held violative of Title VII. The Court affirmed the dismissal of
her complaint because she had not filed her charge with the EEOC
within the applicable notice period. 73 The plaintiff in Evans had
alleged that she was the victim of a "continuing" violation, because the
effect of United's mandatory leave and seniority policies had a continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits.17' In rejecting that argument, the Evans Court stated that "the critical question is whether
any present violation exists," rather than mere continuity. 75 The Court
therefore ruled that a challenge to a seniority system that is currently
neutral in operation "may not be predicated on the mere fact that a
past event which has no present legal significance has affected the
calculation of seniority credit, even if the past event
might at one time
17
have justified a valid claim against the employer. 1
The reasoning applied by the Supreme Court in Evans has also been
applied by courts when dealing with allegations of "continuing" violations of the ADEA. For example, in Platt v. Burroughs Corp.7 7 a
former employee brought suit under the ADEA, alleging that he had
been discriminatorily demoted and denied a subsequent promotion opportunity, that his pay raises had been withheld, and that his job
responsibilities had been gradually diminished from July, 1974 until
March, 1976.1 In order to avoid the two-year statute of limitations, the
plaintiff claimed that there was a continuing violation of his ADEA
rights. In dismissing part of his claim as untimely, the court discussed
the nature of continuing violations. The court held that the requisite
for such "continuing" violations is a continuing discriminatory impact
flowing from the original discriminatory act, but which "involves more
than the usual effects of a discrete act," which would normally be the
foreseeable result of a particular act of discrimination. 7 The Platt
court went on to note that a broad extension of the continuing
discrimination concept would arguably permit a suit to be initiated irrespective of when the alleged discrimination occurred, totally
eliminating any limitations periods under the Act. In particular, the
court noted that overextension of the continuing violation doctrine
173. Id. at 560.
174. Id. at 558.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 560.
177. 424 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
178. Id. at 1332-33.
179. Id. at 1334. The Platt court quoted from a Title VII discrimination case, Cisson v.
Lockheed Georgia Co., 392 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Ga. 1975), in which it had been held
that "claims are most often deemed 'continuing' when they complain of discriminatory hiring practices and are asserted in behalf of a class."
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would destroy the purpose behind section 7(d), which is to insure that
the Secretary of Labor is called in for conciliation purposes when
disputes are fresh, thus giving the employer notice of the plaintiffs intentions at an early date.'
In a more recent case, Thomas v. E. I DuPont de Nemours & Co.,18
an employee sued his employer under the ADEA after his demotion,
claiming that a "continuing" violation tolled the 180-day notice period.
Specifically, he claimed that he had been unjustly demoted due to his
age. Subsequently, he was denied several requests to transfer to
another sales position. However, it was not until nine months after his
demotion that he began to suspect that age had been a motivating factor. At that point, he contacted the Labor Department and was told
that until he was actually discharged his ADEA claim was "continuing." Subsequently, he filed a notice of intent to sue with the Labor
Department, which then found no reasonable cause to believe he had
been the victim of age discrimination. 82
In the ensuing trial, DuPont moved for summary judgment, on the
basis of the plaintiff's untimeliness in filing notice with the Department of Labor. At the hearing, Thomas' counsel pointed out that just
prior to the filing of the notice of intent to sue, Thomas had unsuccessfully applied for an opening in Houston, Texas. Counsel then
sought to amend the complaint so that in the event the court found the
violation was not continuing, plaintiff could include a specific allegation
concerning DuPont's refusal to transfer Thomas, or could initiate
limited discovery as to what openings occurred during the time
1
Thomas expressed a continuing interest in returning to field sales.'
The lower court granted DuPont's motion and dismissed the complaint
as untimely under section 7(d). The district court also denied a request
to amend the complaint."'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the
initial demotion could not be the basis for a continuing ADEA violation, stating that in the context of a refusal to hire and wrongful
discharge suit, only one "continuing" age discrimination violation is
recognized-"that which occurs when the defendant has 'overt, documented policies in full force and effect at the time suit was brought.""'
The court went on to note that no continuing violation has been

180. 424
181. 574
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
Cir. 1974)).

F. Supp. at 1334-35.
F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1978).
at 1326-27.
at 1327.
at 1327-28.
at 1330 (quoting Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485, 489 (5th
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established after a wrongful discharge merely because others had been
hired for similar positions. In the court's view, any other conclusion
would have the practical effect of eliminating the notice provision from
the Act. 8"
However, the court of appeals reversed the district court insofar as
it had refused to allow amendment of the complaint. The court held
that Thomas should be allowed to develop any facts revealing distinct
ADEA violations occurring within 180 days prior to his notice of intent
to sue. 87 Essentially, the court held that where separate ADEA violations may have occurred subsequent to the initial, time-barred violation, the later acts are not similarly time-barred, but may for purposes
of section 7(d) constitute new grounds for a timely ADEA action. A factor that was also noted by the court in Thomas was the fact that it
was not a case of a plaintiff "sleeping on his rights." The plaintiff had
persistently sought to reverse his demotion, at first believing it was a
mistake. He had continually made known his desire for reinstatement
and transfer to another job location. As the court concluded, Thomas
had kept DuPont "awake" to his dissatisfaction over demotion. Therefore, he should have been allowed the chance to prove any separate
ADEA violations occurring within 180 days of his notice of intent to
sue letter.'"
Thomas clearly stands for the idea that a mere demotion or the
impact of such a demotion cannot constitute grounds for finding a continuing ADEA violation. Rather, specific instances of present discriminatory acts must be shown in order to extend the statutory period of
notice or the statute of limitations.188
VII.

CONCLUSION

The recent decisions of federal district courts and courts of appeals,
in which the courts have attempted to interpret and apply the procedural requirements embodied in sections 7(d) and 14(b) of the ADEA,
make it clear that despite the 1978 amendments, this area of the law
continues to be quite unsettled. The obvious dilemma facing courts
arises from the failure of ADEA plaintiffs to meet the various procedural requirements of the Act for one reason or another. Courts
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1331-32.
188. Id. at 1331.
189. Id. at 1331-32. See also Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1369 (6th Cir.
1975) ("If the period of limitation ran from the date on which an employer refused or
failed to remedy a prior unlawful practice under the Act [referring to Title VII], the
period of limitation could be extended indefinitely at the option of the person allegedly
discriminated against").
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have been confronted with the choice of either throwing the noncomplying plaintiffs out of court or of finding some judicial method to circumvent the procedural barriers created by Congress, a result which
could thwart judicial economy as well as potentially punish defendantemployers for the negligence of plaintiffs. When courts have elected to
follow the latter course, the result has been further complication and
incongruity among the circuits as to the procedural prerequisites to
ADEA actions.
It was in apparent response to the complexities associated with an
action under the ADEA that the Senate sought wholesale reform of
the procedural sections of the ADEA when the 1978 amendments were
being considered.'" The House, however, remained adamant in its position that these important procedural requirements should not be
removed from the Act."" The result, as reflected by the post-1978 decisions, has been a continuation of the previous confusion and contradictions which the 1978 amendments were intended, in part, to eliminate.
Courts remain torn between their desire to reach the merits of a
particular case and the need to adhere to the clear procedural mandates of the Act. Even the Supreme Court, in Oscar Mayer, has raised
more questions and created more complications than it rectified.'' At
this point, Congress should once again seek to clarify the Act, to
resolve the numerous ambiguities while paying due deference to the
necessity for judicial economy and the rights of both plaintiffs and
defendants to be free from uncertainty in the application of the law.
190. S. REP. No. 95-697, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
AD. NEWS 496, 515. See id. at 523-24.
191. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, supra note 25, at 533-34.
192. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Bean v. Crocker
Nat'l Bank, 600 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979), is a good example of the ambiguities which have
potentially been created by the Oscar Mayer decision. See discussion at notes 134-138 and
accompanying text supra.

